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
MEXICO'S CENTURY OF INDEPENDENCE

THE AEROPLANE FOR THE NAVY

By Glenn Curtiss



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Abraham Lincoln.

## HOW LINCOLN WON PENNSYLVANIA

AN INTERESTING STORY OF THE MARTYR  
PRESIDENT FOR THE FIRST TIME PUBLISHED

By George T. Ferris



No doubt about Abraham Lincoln, as about all the world's greatest men, myths tend to grow. Yet parallel with this, illusions are dispelled with the varied sidelights that play on the problem of character. The bigness of the object remains the same, but it is blazoned at a little different angle. Lincoln was a personality with so many facets,

though he was in no superficial sense an "Admirable Crichton" that for a long time his complexity will not be adequately appraised. For example, though supremely great as statesman and patriot, at a most critical time of trial, there is reason to believe that he was the most subtle and astute politician of his period in the arts of management. The methods by which he unified diversities of party feeling

in Congress and in his own administrative circle, need not be cited. A story told the present narrator by Colonel Alexander K. McClure, founder and for many years editor of the *Philadelphia Times*, which, so far as he knows, has never appeared in print, illustrates Lincoln's masterly genius in campaign management in a way which confounds one's previous conceptions of the martyr President and his idiosyncracies.

As Colonel McClure put it: "Lincoln was the biggest man in the big way in a great period. But, let me tell you that in all of the craft of the politician he could also give points to the most sagacious machine leader." Colonel McClure prefaced his illustration by saying that Mr. Lincoln believed most profoundly, as did other wisest men in the Nation, that his re-election in 1864 was indispensable to the success of the Union cause, even though military success was running at full tide. To secure his own re-election he would make any sacrifice, and risk tremendous chances. It was more than personal ambition; it was the terrible pressure of destiny, the logic of facts.

While there could be no doubt of the loyalty of General McClellan, and McClellan personally repudiated any settlement of the issues between North and South short of restoration of the Union, the fact remained that the disloyal element in the North supported McClellan to a man, and that, in the event of McClellan's election, that element would exert a tremendous influence, and might, and probably would accomplish the undoing of much that had been achieved in the course of more than three years' war. In the South the Confederates looked to McClellan's election as almost their only hope, and this sentiment was openly avowed by their public men, and even by the rank and file of the soldiers. Lincoln perceived all that was at stake, and determined to spare no effort to win. Looking back at Lincoln's over-

whelming victory at the polls in November, 1864, it is difficult to imagine that he could ever have doubted the result. Yet the evidence that he so doubted is overwhelming, and perhaps his victory might not have been so great if his doubts had not impelled him to take measures as original as they were effective to secure the success he so earnestly desired. How three thousand Pennsylvania soldiers were furloughed from in front of Petersburg to carry to their fellow citizens the story of the soldiers' heroism, their patriotism and their sufferings in the cause of the Union, and how this was done on a secret suggestion from Lincoln himself, is now told for the first time substantially in the words of Colonel McClure to the writer:


Colonel McClure said:

"All the Republican managers in that great political campaign felt that the crux of the situation lay in the Pennsylvania vote. General McClellan, the Democratic candidate, had a very strong following in my State. There were even many ardent war supporters who believed that the man who had fought Antietam only to go into eclipse had been ignobly treated, and were disposed to favor him. How could the Pennsylvania election be best secured? A council was held at Washington to consider ways and means, at which I, as chairman of the Republican State Committee, was present. Many projects were discussed without resolving our doubts and fears. There came a tap at the door, and an intimate friend of the President was ushered in. Lincoln had avoided using even one of his secretaries in breaking in on our conference, the purpose of which he knew and the difficulties of which he appreciated. The message from the head of the nation was to be kept a profound secret. Its import was a daring suggestion, but with such subtle and far-reaching possibilities that it carried us all by storm. That project was the detachment of 3,000

Pennsylvanians from the front at Petersburg, a week before election, to go home and act as missionaries hot from the field of battle as well as to vote.

These men, carrying with them fiery enthusiasm from bivouac and campfire, would, it was conjectured, work magic of ignition in all the cities and hamlets of the Keystone State. But it was clearly seen that it could not be safely done without the acquiescence of the chiefs in the field, Grant and Meade, for it was not presented as an executive order, and that it must be done in the most unostentatious way. Secretary Stanton was bitterly opposed to it, but he was overruled, and Assistant Secretary of War, Charles A. Dana, was sent to the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac to negotiate the transaction. General Grant received the proposition in grim silence, but finally referred it to General Meade. That hard-swearing veteran denounced it vehemently, for at that time it was not a military question of granting furloughs, but of getting fresh reinforcements, wherewith to keep up the tremendous hammering. However, the matter was so presented that at length it was arranged. The equivalent of a brigade of Pennsylvania veterans, picked men as denoted by their colonels, was furloughed for political work in firing the popular heart to the highest pitch.

"Perhaps Pennsylvania would have gone for Lincoln without this very bold and unconventional scheme of electioneering," continued Colonel McClure, "but at all events, the coup



Charles A. Dana.

rolled up a much bigger majority. It certainly showed a side of that remarkable man, Abraham Lincoln, which very few have been disposed to associate with him, the long-sighted purview of what is disparaged as practical politics."

Such was the Philadelphian veteran's narrative. The present writer once repeated this story to a friend at a table d'hote restaurant in New York without mentioning the name of the intermediary. The great editor of the *Sun* sat within arms' length at another table and must have heard every word. His face, however, remained sphinxlike and impassive.

